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Abstract: 
This paper synthesizes the academic, professional, and policy literature on research partnerships 
with an eye toward technology policy. Based on available theory and empirical investigations, 
there are a variety of important reasons why firms participate in research partnerships and a 
number of reasons why governments encourage them. We conclude that technology policy 
authorities need to be aware of these reasons and accordingly be cautious when comparing the 
benefits with the downside effects associated with collaboration. 
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1. Introduction 
As with most public policy-related subjects, important contributions to the literature of what we 
call research partnerships have been made by scholars from a number of disciplines. While most 
of the research reviewed herein has appeared in economics and management journals or in 
scholarly books, it is important to emphasize that the contributing authors represent not only 
those disciplines but also others — such as public administration, philosophy of science, and 
science and technology policy — and, they come from a host of countries. As such, there is a 
variety of indigenous terminologies at play. 
 
Accordingly, our first order of business is to bound the topic of research partnerships by 
establishing a common set of terms. What we offer here is but one interpretation of the various 
terms and concepts that will be reviewed in this paper. Certainly, those in the field may agree or 
disagree with our taxonomy of terms, but a starting point is needed to navigate systematically 
through the literature. 
 
As our starting point, we define a research partnership broadly as an innovation-based 
relationship that involves, at least partly, a significant effort in research and development 
(R&D).4 This definition of a research partnership follows, in spirit, from that recently used by 
the Council on Competitiveness (1996)(p. 3): 
 
Partnerships are defined… as cooperative arrangements engaging companies, 
universities, and government agencies and laboratories in various combinations to pool 
resources in pursuit of a shared R&D objective. 
 
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to synthesize the academic, professional, and policy 
literature on research partnerships. Our review is presented with an eye toward technology policy 
— the theme of this special issue. 
In Section 2, we offer a simple taxonomy of research partnerships. The principal value of this 
taxonomy is to provide one vehicle for discussing not only the literature, but also the data related 
to research partnerships that are being analyzed by empirical researchers and policy makers. In 
Section 3, the theoretical literature on research partnerships is overviewed. This theoretical 
literature has primarily focused on two broad issues: Why is a research partnership formed? and 
What are the results from the formation of a research partnership? Section 4discusses the related 
empirical literature. With the availability of systematic databases on research partnerships during 
the last few years, this literature has grown rapidly and is becoming the foundation for evaluating 
the effectiveness of related policies. Section 5offers a brief description of current technology 
policies that relate to research partnerships in various industrial nations. Section 6summarizes 
our review. 
 
2. Toward a taxonomy of research partnerships 
Based on our definition of a research partnership, namely that a research partnership is as an 
innovation-based relationship, it follows that there are at least two ways to characterize such a 
relationship and hence to characterize research partnerships.5 Research partnerships can be 
characterized in terms of the members of the relationship, or they can be characterized in terms 
of the organizational structure of the relationship; however, these two dimensions need not be 
independent. We consider both characterizations in this section, but we devote greater attention 
to the latter because the theoretical and institutional literature has so developed. 
 
2.1. Partners in a research partnership 
At a broad level, the partners in a research partnership can come from either the public sector or 
the private sector. Obviously, when a partner is a governmental agency, such as a federally 
funded research laboratory in the United States, it represents the public sector; when a partner is 
a private firm, it represents the private sector. Many partnerships also involve universities, and 
from the perspective of ownership authority a university can be public or private. However, it is 
rarely the case that a university's research is not, at least in part, publicly funded. Thus, we view 
for purposes of this taxonomy universities as part of the public sector.6 
 
Given these parameters, research partnerships can be public, they can be private, or they can be 
public/private. From a technology policy perspective, public/private partnerships have attracted 
the greatest attention because they represent a relationship that directly embodies government 
intervention into the innovation process and hence are scrutinized more carefully. 
 
2.2. Organizational structure of research partnerships 
2.2.1. Informal arrangements 
Our organizational structure taxonomy of research partnerships is visually described in Fig. 1. 
Research partnerships can be formal or informal. Very little is known about informal 
partnerships. We do know that many firms informally partner with one another in short-term 
research endeavors, but by the fact that they are informal there is not a systematic way to track 
these partnerships quantitatively much less to study them in detail. Link and Bauer 
(1989)reported that nearly 90% of the research partnerships in which cooperative-research active 
firms from a sample from the U.S. manufacturing sector were involved were informal in nature. 
Not only do firms informally partner with one another, but also they informally partner with 
universities, and, generally, in these relationships, the university is serving in the role of a short-
term project-specific research subcontractor (Hall et al., 1998). 
 
Fig. 1. Taxonomy of research partnerships by organizational structure. 
Fig. 1 also illustrates two categories of formal research partnerships — research corporations and 
research joint ventures (RJVs). Each is discussed below. 
 
2.2.2. Formal arrangements 
During the 1980s and early 1990s, a number of classification schemes of inter-firm relationships 
were introduced in the management and economic literature that we find particularly relevant for 
understanding research partnerships. Based on these schemes, we distinguish two types of formal 
relationships between firms: equity joint ventures that focus on R&D, which we call research 
corporations; and RJVs which are mainly contractual arrangements.7 
 
Research corporations are created by at least two firms that combine their R&D skills and 
resources through equity joint ownership of a separate firm, and generally this new firm or child 
performs only R&D that fits within the broader context of the research agenda of the parent firms 
(Hagedoorn, 1990). Equity joint ventures can be analyzed in the context of transitional firm 
strategies in different market situations. Berg and Hoekman (1988)and Harrigan (1988)have 
argued that market entry, repositioning, and expansion in existing markets, as well as exit 
strategies in declining markets, are well known rationales for firms to enter into equity joint 
ventures. The equity joint ventures are associated with the spreading of risks, sharing of fixed 
costs, capturing of economies of scale, gaining access to new markets, achieving competitive 
repositioning, and sharing of research efforts. These same general arguments hold for research 
corporations. 
 
Many observers (e.g., Hladik, 1985; OECD, 1986) have argued that research corporations 
became popular during the 1980s. Despite the still existing popularity of research corporations, 
the economic and organizational stability of this mode appears questionable. Several studies 
have estimated that about half of all R&D-related equity joint ventures fall short of expectations 
or are disbanded (Berg et al., 1982; Kogut, 1988b). Major reasons for these so-called failures are 
found in either different views of participating firms on strategy, or difficulties associated with 
the management of the venture. More specifically, problems in maintaining research 
corporations are generally thought to derive from the risks of sharing proprietary know-how, the 
desire for control by individual partners, coordination of different time-horizons, disagreement 
on design specifications, government policies, and the effects of minimum efficient scale in 
R&D that can make decentralization of R&D both costly and difficult to control (Harrigan, 1985; 
Hladik, 1985; OECD, 1986; Obleros and Macdonald, 1988).8 
 
RJVs, such as joint R&D pacts or consortia to cover non-equity agreements, are created so that 
firms and other organizations can pool resources in order to undertake joint R&D activities. 
Although the success of such agreements is dependent upon a strong commitment of the 
partners, the organizational interdependence is usually less than in a research corporation 
because no new organizational entity is established. If certain RJV projects are not successful, 
they can be terminated with only a relatively small loss compared to the loss that would be 
incurred when a research corporation is dissolved (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1990; Duysters, 
1996). 
 
A specific subset of RJVs are research contracts that concern R&D cooperation in which one 
firm contracts another firm, frequently a smaller one, to perform a particular research project. 
For the contract-initiating firm, advantages can be found in the possibility to focus on particular 
areas of research with substantial cost saving compared to in-house research facilities. 
Disadvantages for that firm can be found in the lack of in-house expertise to assess the value of 
contract research and the dissociation of development expertise from manufacturing expertise. 
The advantages for the other (smaller) contractor are found in R&D funding and cooperation 
with a larger entity. Disadvantages are found in low profit margins on contract research and 
licensing, and in the transitory nature of these agreements (Hagedoorn, 1996). 
 
3. Theoretical perspectives on research partnerships 
There is a vast literature that attempts to explain, from a theoretical perspective, why firms enter 
into formal research partnerships and what are the results of such relationships to the partners, 
industry, and society at large. We distinguish in Fig. 2 between three broad categories of 
literature in addressing these issues: transaction costs, strategic management, and industrial 
organization theory. The basic rationale for these categories is the long-standing division of labor 
between theorists. Management theorists have traditionally focused on the firm and the internal 
organization of its activities. Industrial organization theorists have, until recently, typically taken 
the firm as the unit of observation to examine strategic intent and the effects of firm actions on 
industrial structure, economic efficiency, and social welfare. Transaction cost theory can be 
viewed ex post as a hybrid of the two. It tries to explain the reasons for firms to organize 
internally, while addressing market or industry forces. 
 
Fig. 2. Formal research partnerships. 
Any literature taxonomy is partially an arbitrary exercise, and the taxonomy in Fig. 2 is no 
exception. It can be argued, for example, that most if not all approaches listed under the strategic 
management category have used arguments from the transaction cost and industrial organization 
categories.9 Similarly, the transaction cost and industrial organization approaches have 
undoubtedly drawn on strategic management to support various arguments. Rather than mutually 
exclusive, the analytical approaches presented here are complementary as viewed both across 
and within individual categories. 
 
3.1. Transaction costs 
A natural starting point for explaining the emergence of research partnerships is the theory of the 
firm, a formidable branch of which is transaction cost economics. According to this school of 
thought, entrepreneurs try different ways to organize a transaction, including arm's length 
markets and market displacements through internal administrative organizations or hierarchies 
(Williamson, 1975 and Williamson, 1985). Assuming a market with no external interference, the 
most economically efficient organizational design is believed to prevail over time. The boundary 
between the market and the firm will then be determined by the relative costs of carrying out a 
transaction under each organizational structure. 
 
Transaction cost theorists have more recently begun to explore alternative forms of adaptation, 
such as involving cooperation among organizations (Menard, 1996a and Menard, 1996b; 
Williamson, 1996) and research partnerships generally fall into this category. 
 
In order to explain why research partnerships form, one must determine why such organizations 
would have a cost advantage over either the market or a hierarchical organization form of 
operation for the specific type of activity. Students of transaction cost theory have posited two 
kinds of relevant costs: production costs and transaction costs. Production costs may vary from 
firm to firm according to proprietary knowledge, abilities to learn, and economies of scale and 
scope. Transaction costs may vary from transaction to transaction. They refer to “the expense 
incurred for writing and enforcing contracts, for haggling over terms and contingent claims, for 
deviating from optimal kinds of investments in order to increase dependence on a party or to 
stabilize a relationship, and for administering a transaction” (Kogut, 1988a, p. 320). 
 
Transaction costs increase steeply when contracts are incomplete, that is, when they do not fully 
specify the actions of each party in every contingency. Intangible assets, including technical 
knowledge, are a primary cause of incomplete contracts. Technical knowledge can be explicit, if 
in the form of a patent or design, or implicit if in the form of know-how shared among the 
employees. Technical knowledge is subject to positive externalities or spillovers, its production 
is subject to significant uncertainties, and its dissemination can induce opportunistic behavior. 
Research partnerships are thus explained in transaction cost economics as a hybrid form of 
organization between the market and the hierarchy to facilitate carrying out an activity 
specifically related to the production and dissemination of technical knowledge. 
 
What makes this hybrid form of organization preferable to the internalization of the market for 
technical knowledge by bringing the necessary capabilities under unified control? According to 
Kogut (1988a), the situational characteristic favoring the research partnership is higher 
uncertainty over specifying and monitoring the performance of the other party. Research 
partnerships achieve a mechanism to provide the necessary incentives to perform to required 
standards by turning the expected hostage situation in the market transaction into a mutual 
hostage situation in a cooperative agreement through the commitment of resources by partners to 
the common cause.10 
 
3.2. Strategic management11 
There are several approaches taken by strategic management scholars. Five such approaches are 
reviewed below. 
 
3.2.1. Competitive force 
The competitive force approach toward research partnerships (Porter 1980, Porter 1985; 
Harrigan, 1988) derives, in part, from the traditional structure-conduct-performance paradigm of 
industrial organization theory. An effective competitive strategy involves the firm taking 
offensive or defensive action in order to create a defensible position against competitors or 
influence them in its favor. Collaboration is seen as a means of shaping competition by 
improving a firm's comparative competitive position. 
 
Coalitions involve coordinating or sharing value chains with partners that broaden the effective 
scope of the firm's own activities. By using coalitions, a firm can benefit from a broader scope of 
activities without spending precious resources to enter new market segments (Porter, 1986). 
Inter-firm technological collaboration permits firms to react swiftly to market needs and allows 
them to bring technology to the marketplace faster. 
 
3.2.2. Strategic network 
The strategic network approach argues that the network is a new form of organization and 
strategy. Multiple cooperative relationships of a firm can be the source of its competitive 
strength. In general, three categories of theoretical rationales can explain the formation of 
strategic networks: efficiency, synergy, and power. 
 
Networks can achieve efficiencies via scale and scope economies and via the reduction of 
transactional inefficiency in the open market. The network arrangement allows a firm to 
concentrate on those parts of the value chain that better reflect the firm's competitive advantage. 
Firms within a network are thus able to capture the benefits of specialization, focus, and scale. 
The effectiveness of a network can be attributed to technological reasons, the opportunity for 
lowering transaction costs (Gomes-Casseres, 1996), and the possibility for joint value creation 
(Jarillo, 1988). 
 
With respect to exploiting synergies, Miles and Snow (1984)argued that networks can be formed 
to link and exploit the different competencies of a group of firms within a quasi-organizational 
framework. Network formation can also be understood by using power as the central concept, 
meaning the ability to influence the decisions or actions of others (Thorelli, 1986). Early 
adopters of network strategies can enjoy a first-mover advantage in securing resources, gaining 
market position and political influence, controlling information, and brokering new cooperative 
arrangements (Miles and Snow, 1984). 
 
3.2.3. Resource-based view of the firm 
This view, traceable to Penrose (1959), has recently become popular among strategic 
management analysts (Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Mahoney and Pandian, 
1992; Peteraf, 1993; Mowery et al., 1998). According to this approach, the sources of sustained 
competitive advantage are firm resources that are valuable, rare, and not easily substitutable. 
Performance is based on the strategic differentiation that the firm achieves in the marketplace, 
that is, the firm's unique capabilities and its competitors' difficulty in imitating them. In high 
technology industries, such capabilities relate primarily to the development and exploitation of 
advanced technologies. 
 
Access to external complementary resources may be necessary in order to fully exploit the 
existing resources and develop sustained competitive advantages (Teece, 1986). Alliances, 
including research partnerships, can facilitate access. Alliances may, however, work better in 
some environments than in others (Chesbrough and Teece, 1996). 
 
3.2.4. Dynamic capabilities 
This approach is a related dynamic view of resource and capability accumulation (Teece and 
Pisano, 1994; Teece et al., 1997). The primary focus is on the mechanisms by which firms 
accumulate and deploy new skills and capabilities, and on the contextual factors that influence 
the rate and direction of this process. Teece et al. (1997)define dynamic capabilities as the firm's 
ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competencies to address rapidly 
changing environments. 
 
Inter-firm collaboration can be viewed as a vehicle for organizational learning, that can be used 
to analyze the motive, process and outcome of strategic technical alliances (Hamel and Prahalad, 
1989; Mody, 1993). Prahalad and Hamel (1990), for example, point to cooperative relationships 
as a means for internalizing core competencies and enhancing competitiveness. A primary factor 
influencing a firm's ability to develop technology-based competencies via a cooperative venture 
is the potential to learn from that relationship. Hamel (1991)takes a skill-based view of the firm, 
considering an alliance primarily as a route to acquire the skills of another firm. 
 
A rapidly expanding stream of literature has emerged during the last few years focusing on 
corporate learning and organizational modes that facilitate such learning (Foss, 1993; Kogut and 
Zander, 1993). Cooperation is considered a mechanism to facilitate the transfer of certain types 
of knowledge and enhance the firm's learning capabilities. It is not so much the cost of the 
transfer (which would be the focus of the transaction cost approach) but the effectiveness of the 
transfer and the ability or experience of the firm in accessing and handling new knowledge that 
may create the need for collaboration. The literature on the learning organization is clearly 
related to the resource-based view of the firm and the dynamic capabilities approaches 
(Hodgson, 1998; Sachwald, 1998). Research partnerships are seen as mechanisms enabling firms 
to learn and enter new technological areas (Dodgson, 1991) and to deal more effectively with 
technological and market uncertainty. 
 
3.2.5. Strategic options to new technologies 
This approach to explaining collaboration complements the dynamic capabilities approach by 
considering how managers can determine prospectively the set of resources and capabilities 
necessary for superior future performance in uncertain market environments (Sanchez, 1993). 
Strategy can be considered as a process of continuously maximizing the strategic options of a 
firm (Sanchez, 1995). This model can be applied to evaluating the ways in which different 
organizational schemes (market, network, and hierarchy) contribute to or impede the firm's 
ability to optimize its strategic options (Dixit and Pindyck, 1995; Trigeorgis, 1996). It is 
suggested that a research partnership that allows resources to be incrementally committed, 
contingent on positive outcomes, will often be more attractive than precommitting the full 
expected cost for developing a new technology especially in the presence of high market and 
technological uncertainty. Collaboration may assist companies to gain valuable experience and 
increase their exposure to related markets and their ability to sense and respond to new 
opportunities (Kogut, 1991). 
 
3.3. Industrial organization 
Industrial organization scholars have been interested in the resource allocation and economic 
welfare effects of inter-firm cooperation in R&D as part of a broader concern over the 
potentiality of failure in the market of scientific and technological knowledge. This failure is due 
to the perceived public good nature of knowledge that makes its production relatively more 
expensive than its transmission.12 The difficulty in appropriating the returns from knowledge is 
said to account for inadequate incentives to invest in it. 
 
Recent theoretical literature dealing with technological competition has depended heavily on 
game-theoretic tools and formal mathematical modeling. The models can essentially be 
categorized into two categories: non-tournament models and tournament. The expectation of 
market failure has driven the analyses, and it is reflected in under-investment and duplication of 
non-cooperative R&D effort in non-tournament models and the over-investment in R&D in 
tournament models. 
 
3.3.1. Non-tournament models 
Non-tournament models focus on the extent of innovation, approximated by the degree of cost 
reduction or product differentiation. Firms are assumed to invest in R&D in order to, for 
example, decrease costs and then compete in terms of prices or outputs in the product market. 
The model's defining characteristics are a setup with many different research paths that firms in 
an industry can follow in pursuit of technological advance, and the possibility of more than one 
winner. An advance made on one research path may be used irrespective of whether competitor 
firms have also made similar advances on other research paths. These paths, however, are 
sufficiently similar to be viewed as perfect substitutes. This similarity allows for the 
incorporation of R&D spillovers into the models, meaning that knowledge can escape the control 
of the firm and benefit the competitor pursuing another research path. 
 
The vast majority of the theoretical work on cooperative R&D has, until recently, followed the 
non-tournament approach. Strategic, static, multistage models comparing the performance of 
cooperative and non-cooperative industrial setups in the presence of imperfectly appropriable, 
cost-reducing R&D are replete in the literature. Such analyses followed the seminal contributions 
of Spence (1984), Katz (1986)and D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), including, for example, 
De Bondt and Veugelers (1991), De Bondt et al. (1992), Kamien et al. (1992), Suzumura (1992), 
Simpson and Vonortas (1994), Vonortas (1994), and Brod and Shivakumar (1997). The basic 
focus has been the investigation of the relative efficiencies of competition and cooperation in 
R&D — specifically in RJVs — in raising final output production and enhancing social welfare. 
 
A consistent finding across most of this literature has been that spillovers have an important role 
in defining the relative efficiencies of non-cooperative and cooperative industrial setups. In the 
absence of spillovers, the market (non-cooperation) seems to do better. The reverse happens in 
the presence of spillovers. By internalizing knowledge spillovers, partnerships tend to break the 
trade-off between spillovers and R&D investment. Cooperation may, then, improve firm 
incentives to undertake highly inappropriable R&D, especially when the product market is 
relatively not concentrated and/or independent and competing R&D is also undertaken. R&D 
cooperation performs consistently better — in terms of resulting in more R&D investment and 
greater output — the higher the rate of knowledge spillovers. Moreover, the extent of 
information sharing among partners is positively related to the ability of the research partnership 
to raise social welfare. In symmetric industry settings, partnerships that both coordinate R&D 
efforts and that achieve greater information sharing among partners yield the highest 
technological efforts and social welfare, surpassing research partnerships that simply coordinate 
R&D efforts (Kamien et al., 1992; Combs, 1993; Vonortas, 1994).13 
 
3.3.2. Tournament models 
Tournament models emphasize the timing of innovation where the winner of an innovative race 
earns the right to an exogenously or endogenously determined monopolistic return.14 This 
essentially implies a single path to the technological advance, and the game often takes the form 
of a patent race. The analytical focus of tournament models has been on determining the number 
of firms entering the race; the aggregate R&D investment, and its distribution across firms and 
time; and the effects of market power, technological advantage and technological uncertainty 
(Reinganum, 1989). 
 
In the models with knowledge sharing, cooperation may well decrease overall R&D expenditures 
compared to the non-cooperative setup (Martin, 1994). Even so, if partners compete in the 
product market following the innovation, cooperation will, in general, be socially beneficial by 
passing more of the gains to the consumers. However, the requirement in such a model that the 
winner shares the available information with the losers means that the partnership will not form 
unless it is subsidized. Such results can be extended to the case where the partnership does not 
incorporate all firms in the industry. The socially optimal market structure for organizing R&D 
proves to be complex, however, depending on the number of firms and the ability of the partners 
to exclude rivals from the technology. 
 
One example of the tournament approach to R&D collaboration is found in Katsoulacos and 
Ulph (1997), who address two basic issues.15 The first issue relates to the endogeneity of 
knowledge spillovers in RJVs; in addition to the amount of R&D expenditure, firms can choose 
their spillover parameter both inside and outside the partnership.16 The second issue related to 
whether firms undertake complementary or substitutive R&D. These two issues are important in 
the context of policies subsidizing information-sharing research partnerships that have been 
implemented in the United States and European Union. It is shown that firms choose to 
cooperate fully when they undertake complementary R&D (and the cooperative equilibrium then 
is the social optimum). If the firms undertake substitutive R&D, they share no information 
outside the partnership. While they are better off joining a partnership, subsidies are necessary to 
turn the cooperative equilibrium to a socially optimum solution. 
 
Overall, as summarized in Table 1, the theoretical literature on research partnerships has varies 
in terms of both research focus and results. This variability reflects the fact that industrial setups 
differ in terms of market organization, the environment for innovation, strategic interaction 
between firms, and the objectives and organization of inter-firm collaborative agreements. And 
in addition, no two firms are alike, and their strategies differ even within the same industry 
(Nelson, 1995). 
 
 
 
Table 1. Theoretical arguments to two basic questions related to research partnerships 
Question Transaction costs Strategic management Industrial organization 
Incentives to form 
a research 
partnership 
⋅ Minimize cost of 
transactions involving 
intangible assets (technical 
knowledge) 
⋅ Share R&D costs ⋅ Share R&D costs 
 ⋅ Circumvent incomplete 
contracts 
⋅ Pool risks ⋅ Pool risks 
 ⋅ Avoid opportunistic market 
behavior 
⋅ Economies of scale and scope ⋅ Economies of scale and 
scope 
 ⋅ Avoid high costs of 
internalizing the activity 
⋅ Co-opt competition ⋅ Co-opt competition 
  ⋅ Improve competitive position ⋅ Accelerate return on 
investments 
  ⋅ Coordinate value chains with 
coalition partners 
⋅ Access complementary 
resources 
  ⋅ Increase efficiency, synergy, 
power through network 
⋅ Decelerate rate of 
innovation 
  ⋅ Access complementary 
resources to exploit own resources 
⋅ Increase market power 
  ⋅ Use collaboration as learning 
vehicle to accumulate and deploy 
new skills and capabilities 
 
  ⋅ Learn from partners; transfer 
technology 
 
  ⋅ Create new investment options  
 Expected results of research partnerships 
Partners ⋅ Successfully meet 
incentives 
⋅ Successfully meet incentives ⋅ Successfully meet 
incentives 
  ⋅ Interdependency ⋅ Interdependency 
   ⋅ Increase R&D efficiency 
   ⋅ Increase flow of 
information 
Question Transaction costs Strategic management Industrial organization 
Industry, society ⋅ Better resource allocation ⋅ Industry competitiveness ⋅ Increase overall R&D 
expenditures when 
spillovers are high 
   ⋅ Increase social welfare 
   ⋅ Subsidize on certain 
occasions 
 
4. Empirical perspectives on research partnerships 
The empirical literature on research partnerships has over the years taken one of two approaches. 
One approach investigates research partnership activity through analyses of existing data sets or 
through specialized surveys, and the other approach investigates using the case studies. Both 
research methods have reached important conclusions and have provided useful insights into 
science and technology policy. 
 
The database analyses are, however, fragmented, and somewhat limited both in numbers and in 
scope because few systematic databases exist and because survey work has been constrained as 
scholars are still in the learning stage with regards to research partnership behavior. 
 
4.1. Existing databases related to research partnerships 
Three major databases related to research partnerships are described in this section. 
 
4.1.1. The MERIT-CATI database 
The MERIT-CATI (Cooperative Agreements and Technology Indicators) database is a relational 
database covering over 13,000 technical cooperative agreements involving about 6000 different 
parent companies. It contains information on each agreement and selected information on those 
companies participating in agreements. Cooperative agreements are defined as common interests 
between industrial partners that are not connected through ownership. Joint research pacts, 
second-sourcing, and licensing agreements are examples of inter-firm agreements in this 
database.17 
 
Relevant input of information for each alliance relates to: the number of companies involved, 
names of companies or important subsidiaries, year of establishment, time-horizon, duration and 
year of dissolution, capital investments and involvement of banks and research institutes or 
universities, field(s) of technology, and modes of cooperation. 
 
The MERIT-CATI database is maintained by John Hagedoorn and his colleagues. 
 
4.1.2. The CORE database 
The CORE (COoperative REsearch) database was constructed under the sponsorship of the 
National Science Foundation and is maintained under their support by Link. Its resource base is 
information contained in filings with the U.S. Department of Justice as reported in the Federal 
Register (discussed in Section 5).18 
 
Research partnerships gain two significant benefits from such voluntary filing with the 
Department of Justice: if subjected to criminal or civil antitrust action, they are evaluated under a 
rule-of-reason criterion that determines whether the venture improves social welfare; and if 
found to fail the criterion, they are subject to actual rather than treble damages. 
 
The unit of observation in the CORE database is the RJV. All public domain information 
contained in each new and updated Federal Register filing is coded in the CORE database, and 
that information is supplemented with other sources of information to describe the industry 
represented in the research partnership.19 
 
4.1.3. The NCRA-RJV database 
The NCRA-RJV database also uses information on U.S.-based RJVs from the Federal Register. 
The particular characteristic of this database is that it enables research where the unit of analysis 
is the partner rather than the partnership. Federal Register information is supplemented with 
information on the characteristics of the business partners from independent sources, including 
CompuStat for publicly traded firms and CorpTech for privately owned firms. Important features 
of the NCRA-RJV database include: 
 
• the database, like CORE, covers partnerships consistently classified as RJVs under a single 
official definition; 
• the database has been designed to support both qualitative and quantitative research; and 
• the database combines the information on joint venture characteristics with longitudinal 
financial performance information on business participants and their industrial diversification.20 
The NCRA-RJV database is maintained by Vonortas. 
4.2. Empirical research issues 
The empirical research related to research partnerships focuses on four general issues: (i) trends 
in research partnerships, (ii) composition and focus of research partnerships, (iii) motives for 
participating in research partnerships, and (iv) benefits from participation in research 
partnerships. 
 
4.2.1. Trends in research partnerships 
Research on the MERIT-CATI database has revealed a number of worldwide trends in the inter-
firm technology partnerships during a period of more than 25 years. Specifically, the number of 
new partnerships set up annually gradually increased from about 30–40 in the early 1970s to 
100–200 in the late 1970s. The 1980s marked a period of a further rapid increase. Starting from 
around 200 per year, the number of new partnerships announced every year reached around 600 
or more later in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
Although formal research partnerships were little known about during the 1970s, researchers 
have found some indications that this organizational form was gaining in popularity. Hladik 
(1985)documented how researchers of the well-known Harvard Multinational Enterprise project 
were somewhat puzzled by the increasing number of international R&D joint ventures. At the 
time, it was thought that joint ventures would be aimed mainly at manufacturing activities and 
not at critical, firm-specific activities like R&D and innovation. 
 
The MERIT-CATI data reveals that during the early 1970s about 80% of the research 
partnerships were research corporations. Gradually, this distribution changed. By the mid-1990s, 
more than 85% of research partnerships did not involve equity investments. Globally, RJVs 
rapidly became the dominant form of research partnerships. 
 
Two additional trends are noteworthy; the degree to which inter-firm research relationships are 
made between domestic or international partners, and the role that high-technology sectors play 
in inter-firm technology collaboration. The share of domestic inter-firm research collaboration 
recorded in the CATI database as occurring during the 1970s and 1980s was only about 35% of 
the total. The share of domestic partnerships has gradually risen to about 45% during the 1990s. 
Further, this change has largely been caused by the notable role of intra-U.S. collaboration in two 
major fields, biotechnology and information technology. The very important role that United 
States firms have played in leading edge research in these two fields not only makes them 
attractive partners for international collaboration, but also raises the probability of intra-U.S. 
joint research at the scientific and technological frontier (Hagedoorn, 1996). 
 
Following the OECD classification of industries (OECD, 1997), during most of the 1970s (when 
some current high-technology activities such as biotechnology and advanced materials research 
were almost non-existent), the share of high-technology sectors was on average about 40% of the 
total number of inter-firm partnerships. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the share of high-
technology research collaboration increased to between 50% and 60%. From the mid-1980s to 
the mid-1990s this share increased even further. According to the most recent data, about 80% of 
the inter-firm research relationships are established in high-technology industries. In other 
words, inter-firm research partnerships have become mainly concentrated in a small number of 
high-technology industries. 
 
Research by Freeman and Hagedoorn (1994)and Hagedoorn (1996)revealed a number of other 
trends in the international distribution of inter-firm research partnerships based on their analysis 
of the CATI database. 
 
⋅ The majority of research relationships have been established within the Triad — North 
America, Japan, and the European Union. During the 1970s and 1980s the share of the Triad in 
all these partnerships was over 95%. In the 1990s, this dominance became less strong as the 
share of other combinations rose to about 20%. 
 
⋅ The growth of inter-firm research partnerships with partners from outside the Triad reflects the 
growth of the share of alliances with companies from South East Asian countries, such as South 
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong. 
 
⋅ In high-technology industries, the share of the intra-Triad research relationships has remained 
high. Only during the mid-1990s did this share for the developed economies decrease to about 
90%. 
 
⋅ The growth in the share of non-Triad countries is primarily in the non-high technology sectors, 
including the more traditional engineering and manufacturing industries. The share of countries 
outside the Triad in partnerships in these sectors increased from about 15% in the 1970s and 
early 1980s to about 30% during the 1990s. 
 
The time trend of formation of U.S. research partnerships registered with the Department of 
Justice in the United States has been studied extensively through the CORE and NCRA-RJV 
databases. The significant increases in registrations during 1985–1995 have been followed by 
decreases in the last 3 years, which have been particularly steep in 1997 and 1998. The reasons 
for this change are not clearly understood. The changing fortunes of the Advanced Technology 
Program (ATP) — a rapid increase in the funding of partnerships during 1994–1995 and a 
significant drop afterwards — may explain part of this change. Examining the formation of 
partnerships from the CORE database, Brod and Link (1996)concluded that another part of this 
trend is due to changes over time in announced public attention by the Department of Justice 
toward antitrust violations. This so-called announcement effect gives firms a greater incentive to 
seek indemnification and file their cooperative R&D intentions. 
4.2.2. Composition and focus of research partnerships 
As previously discussed in Section 2, a research partnership can be classified as public, private, 
or public/private on the basis of the composition of its membership. Research on the composition 
of members in RJVs is being conducted by a growing number of scholars, with many paying 
particular attention to the role of universities. 
 
Baldwin (1996), Baldwin and Link (1998), and Vonortas (1997)document the extent to which 
university participation in partnerships has changed over time; and Baldwin and Link (1998)and 
Hall et al. (1998)have gone beyond descriptive analyses to investigate possible economic 
motives for why a research group of firms would invite a university to participate. Relatedly, 
Leyden and Link (1999)asked a similar question with regard to a federal laboratory being a 
research partner in a partnership (and federal laboratories have similar public characteristics to 
universities). Both Baldwin and Link (1998)and Leyden and Link (1999)conclude that only the 
larger partnerships — where size is measured in terms of number of members — invite a public 
partner to participate. The reason is that in large partnerships appropriability has already been 
diminished due to the size of the venture. 
 
Regarding the research focus of RJVs, Vonortas (1997)found for the United States that 
information technology was the dominant field, followed by advanced materials. This findings 
largely agreed with the more global evidence provided by Hagedoorn (1995)and Hagedoorn and 
Schakenraad, 1990 and Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1992. 
 
4.2.3. Motives for participating in research partnerships 
Link and Zmud (1984), in what may be the first broad-based empirical analysis of research 
partnerships, documented that firms in the then video display terminal industry undertook 
research cooperatively (and informally) with other firms in an effort to maintain and increase 
their market share. RJV participation was a strategic means to be at the forefront of new 
technological developments in the field. 
 
Relatedly, Link and Bauer (1989)and Link (1990)examined three possible strategic motives for a 
firm to participate in a partnership: to gain technical ability to diversify horizontally into new 
product lines, to gain technical ability to vertically integrate production activities, and to gain 
technical ability to leap-frog competitions within their primary line of business. Leap-frog 
competition was not a strategic factor that influenced manufacturing firms' decisions to 
participate in partnerships.21 Rather, those firms that faced market threats from foreign 
competition were using partnerships as a vehicle toward horizontal diversification, and those not 
facing such pressures were using partnerships as a vehicle to increase their market share by 
becoming vertically integrated. 
 
On the basis of this analysis of the European semiconductor industry, Martin (1996)has argued 
that firms will engage in research partnerships, be they domestic or international, to further their 
competitive strategic goals. Public policies, at least in the semiconductor industry, have not been 
successful in Europe to redirect firms from these competitive strategic goals toward an agenda 
that favors domestic growth. 
 
The strategic motives of firms to engage in research partnerships were also emphasized in the 
empirical analysis of Vonortas (1997). The examined partnerships appeared to provide a vehicle 
for virtual diversification into fluid technology fields — lacking well specified technological 
trajectories — characterized by high technological and market uncertainty but also high 
technological opportunities and growth potential.22 In addition, firms participate in order to raise 
the necessary R&D funds or leverage their own, access complementary resources, exploit 
research synergies, and create new investment options. These results strongly supported the 
argument of the resource-based view of the firm and related management approaches. 
 
There is a well-documented history of informal industry/university research relationships, but it 
has only been the more recent literature that has focused on the motivations and incentives to 
industry and to academe to enter into such relationships.23 While this so-called behavioral 
empirical literature is just developing, there appears to be a consensus of opinion about certain 
issues. The first motivation is access to complementary research activity and complementary 
research results.24Cohen et al. (1997)provide a selective review of this strategic literature, 
emphasizing the studies that have documented that university research enhances firms sales, 
R&D productivity, and patenting activity.25 As Rosenberg and Nelson (1994)(p. 340) note: 
“What university research most often does today is to stimulate and enhance the power of R&D 
done in industry, as contrasted with providing a substitute for it.” The second motivation is 
access to key university personnel.26 The administration-based financial pressures for faculty to 
engage in applied commercial research with industry are growing.27Zechhauser (1996)(p. 
12,746) is subtle when he refers to the supposed importance of industry-supported research to 
universities as he describes how such relationships might develop: “Information gifts [to 
industry] may be a part of [a university's] commercial courtship ritual.” Overall, however, there 
is a void of information about the nature of the industry–university interaction that occurs when 
the two informally partner in an research partnership. 
 
4.2.4. Benefits from participation in research partnerships 
Link and Bauer, 1987a, Link and Bauer, 1987b and Link and Bauer, 1989have shown a positive 
correlation between cooperative R&D conducted by a firm, the firm's market share, and the 
productivity of the firm's in-house R&D. The latter result has been interpreted to suggest that 
participation in a research partnership increases the absorptive capacity of firms with regard to 
their R&D activity. 
 
Along these same lines, Scott (1996)reports, for an analysis of a small sample of firms that 
formed research partnerships to develop new processes for reducing toxic air emission, that 
cooperation appears to foster new research that would not have been initiated without the 
cooperative experience. This conclusion for toxic air emission is similar to the conclusions 
reached by others that cooperation in R&D does expand the scope of the firm's R&D horizon. 
Besides case study work, however, the empirical evidence on this point is severely limited. The 
earlier concern of Scott, 1988 and Scott, 1993is that widespread cooperation could lead to a 
decrease in competition, and this decrease may not be offset by an increase in innovation-related 
benefits, may indeed have merit. A related argument, combining some initial evidence on 
multimarket and multiproject contact between pairs of firms in U.S.-based research partnerships 
has also echoed by Vonortas (forthcoming). 
 
Link (1998a)Link (1998b)reported that members of two ATP-sponsored research partnerships 
experienced gains in their R&D efficiency as well. These gains were realized from reduced 
duplication of research costs and reduced cycle time. Two additional case studies reached similar 
conclusions in terms of reporting significant benefits to the participating firms (Vonortas, 1999). 
Relatedly, a similar experience was reported by the members of SEMATECH from the 
organizations collaborative efforts. Link et al. (1996)estimated that research collaboration 
through SEMATECH earned member firms a return of about 63% on their membership dues. 
These benefits accrued primarily through reduced duplication of research costs.28 
 
The empirical evidence of benefits to partnership members has depended primarily on case 
studies. While this literature has shown generally high returns to collaboration, it must be 
emphasized that it does suffer from selection bias; the partnerships studied often tend to be some 
of the most successful, and hence those with high returns. 
 
5. Policies toward research partnerships 
A major objective of policies toward research partnerships in the early 1980s in both the United 
States and the European Community (EC) was to arrest the relative decline in the international 
competitiveness of high technology sectors. R&D featured prominently on the policy agenda. 
Both regions introduced major changes in the law to accommodate the policy shift. The United 
States moved forward with a twin strategy of relaxing its relatively strict antitrust laws and of 
strengthening its intellectual property rights policy laws. The EC moved forward by creating the 
legal basis for central science and technology policy in the Single European Act of 1987, and by 
institutionalizing a series of 4-year, successive Framework Programmes on Research and 
Technological Development (FWPs). Interestingly, the promotion of cooperative R&D became a 
central policy tool for both the U.S. and the EC at about the same time. Meanwhile, Japan 
continued its long-standing policy on cooperative R&D, having undergone a major shift in the 
focus of most government sponsored research partnerships in the late 1970s. The rationale for 
the Japanese partnerships changed from assisting various industries to catch up with the world's 
state-of-the-art technology to assisting high technology firms and industries push the state-of-
the-art forward. Highlighted below are selective national policies related to research 
partnerships; no effort is made to comprehensively describe or critique these policies.29 
 
5.1. U.S. policies 
The U.S. government acted on research partnerships in the early 1980s under mounting evidence 
that an increasing number of firms in high technology sectors had started to choose cooperative 
R&D agreements routinely to carry out technological activities. The willingness of policy 
decision-makers to promote cooperative R&D rested on concerns about the relative loss of 
international economic competitiveness. These fears were fueled by the apparent success of fast-
follower countries that promoted cooperative R&D to access, assimilate, and diffuse technology 
quickly. Japan served as a prominent example. The necessary policy justification for 
collaboration was provided by traditional economic argument of market failure in R&D. 
 
This new competitive policy approach was underlined in the United States by the extensive 
changes in antitrust and intellectual property rights regulation beginning in the early 1980s. The 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission promoted a new approach to 
examining the competitive effects of partial mergers, which included research partnerships. 
Rather than a per se approach, such mergers should be judged on a rule-of-reason basis where 
the static anticompetitive effects would be weighted against the dynamic benefit effects from the 
partnership. This change in approach eventually led to the passage of the National Cooperative 
Research Act (NCRA) of 1984, and its 1993 amendment the National Cooperative Research and 
Production Act (NCRPA).30 All filings are published in the Federal Register. 
 
Also, in the early 1980s, there was a series of legislative actions, starting with the Baye–Dole 
Act in 1980, that created a legal framework for permitting government contractors to benefit 
financially from the results of the research undertaken with or for the government (excepting 
national defense items). This legislation spurred research cooperation between industry, 
universities and government laboratories. Part of the induced collaborative activity (involving 
government labs) is conducted under Cooperative Research and Development Agreements, or 
CRADAs. 
 
5.2. EC policies 
Similar to the United States, the EC entered the 1980s with increasing anxiety over the perceived 
gradual loss of competitiveness and the effects of globalization in high-technology industries. In 
the EC's case, however, there were other factors influencing policy in addition to the widely 
perceived change in the global forces affecting R&D and innovation. These other factors 
included the continuing expansion of the Community and the wide disparities between the 
industrial and technological capabilities of the various country members; the already well 
established, but very different, S&T policy infrastructures in a number of the larger and wealthier 
country members, and the total lack of such infrastructures in the cohesion country members; 
and the absence of the appropriate legal framework and institutions at the EC level for 
supporting a consistent technology policy. 
 
The catalytic events in the early 1980s in the form of rapid technological advances and the loss 
of market share by the indigenous European electronics industry led the European Commission 
in 1981 to establish the pilot ESPRIT program with the endorsement of the twelve largest 
European producers of electronics. ESPRIT served as the progenitor of the European Framework 
Programs on R&D (FWPs) to which it lent many of its features. One such feature was the 
support of cooperative R&D. Another was the public support of pre-competitive or pre-
normative research that was sufficiently far from the market. FWPs have become the vehicle for 
the implementation of the S&T policy of the European Union. FWPs provide the policy umbrella 
encompassing all programs through which the EC supports R&D in particular areas. 
 
Four FWPs have already been completed: 1984–1987, 1987–1991, 1990–1994, and 1994–1998. 
The fifth (1998–2002) has just been initiated. A prerequisite for support — up to 50% of total 
joint research costs — of a research partnership is the inclusion of agents based in at least two 
EU member countries; industry, universities and research laboratories can participate. 
 
Needless to say, European policies for cooperative R&D go beyond the EC level; they spread 
across all EU member states.31 Given the wide variety of national S&T policy systems in 
Europe, policies targeted to cooperative R&D vary significantly. Among EU member countries, 
one can distinguish between the four large industrialized and R&D spending countries (France, 
Germany, Italy, and United Kingdom), the seven small to medium size industrialized countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Sweden), and the four less 
industrialized cohesion countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) that formally introduced 
S&T policy only during the last few decades. Even within these groups, there are great 
differences between countries with traditionally more centralized S&T policy systems (e.g., 
France) and others with more decentralized systems (e.g., Germany); or between countries with 
traditional mission-oriented polices (e.g., France and UK) and those with a tradition in diffusion-
oriented polices (e.g., Germany). 
 
This diversity has also been reflected in policy approaches to cooperative R&D, including the 
nature and extent of government involvement in promoting and regulating research 
partnerships.32 There are, nonetheless, some general trends across regions. One trend is that, 
while the European Framework Programs have tended to support pre-competitive cooperative 
research, national/regional policies have often supported partnerships dealing with research 
closer to market. A second trend is that national and regional governments across Europe have 
tried to use research partnerships as one of the mechanisms for strengthening the links among 
industries, universities, and government laboratories. A third trend is that governments at all 
levels have increasingly seen strategic partnering and network building as mechanisms to 
enhance technological prowess and economic competitiveness in high-technology manufacturing 
and service sectors. 
 
5.3. Japanese policies 
Japan was a pioneer in supporting cooperative R&D in the post-War period. Like industrial 
policy and general S&T policy, the objectives and organization of Japanese cooperative R&D 
organizations have changed over this time period. The idea of research associations was basically 
imported from the UK after the war, but the use of research associations was transformed from 
an instrument for assisting declining firms and industries to an instrument for gathering, 
adapting, and distributing technological information more efficiently in high technology 
industries. Following the Mining and Manufacturing Industry Technology Research Association 
of 1961, a large number of Japanese Engineering Research Associations (ERAs) were 
established in a wide variety of sectors (Sigurdson, 1986). More recently, Sakakibara 
(1997)documented 237 government promoted ERAs set up between 1959 and 1992; however, it 
is hard to know exactly how many ERAs have been established due to the lack of a unified 
source of information. 
 
In the mid-1970s, the focus of ERAs changed significantly from generating/adapting specific 
technologies, to assisting sectors catch up with world technology, to undertaking state-of-the-art 
research to provide a broader technological superstructure for high technology sectors (Oshima 
and Kodama, 1986). An early example of the more aggressive ERAs is the very large scale 
integration circuit (VLSI) association. 
 
While many ERAs have reportedly met their objectives successfully, it is rather doubtful that any 
of them produced the returns to industry that western countries thought at the time. Government 
funds were small, measurable technology outputs fairly modest, and collaboration often meant an 
agreement to share only the cost but not the research process. 
 
ERAs represent only one form of collaborative R&D in Japan. Such cooperation has also 
included trade associations, joint research institutes, collaboration within large firm networks 
(keiretsu), and private sector formal and informal collaborative agreements. Japanese firms have 
also been active participants in international research partnerships. The basic difference of ERAs 
is that they are formed under the auspices and guidance of the government and often include a 
significant proportion of the large players in a technological area. 
 
6. Conclusions 
According to available theory and empirical evidence, firms participate in research partnerships 
in order to: 
• decrease transaction costs in activities governed by incomplete contracts; 
• broaden the effective scope of activities; 
• increase efficiency, synergy, and power through the creation of networks; 
• access external complementary resources and capabilities to better exploit existing resources 
and develop sustained competitive advantage; 
• promote organizational learning, internalize core competencies, and enhance competitiveness; 
• create new investment options in high-opportunity, high-risk activities; 
• internalize knowledge spillovers and enhance the appropriability of research results, while 
increasing information sharing among partners; 
• lower R&D costs; 
• pool risk; and 
• co-opt competition. 
Governments have promoted and supported research partnerships in order to: 
• correct market failures in R&D investment, particularly in the presence of highly non-
appropriable research; 
• speed up technological innovation, aiming at increased international competitiveness; and 
• increase technological information exchange among firms, universities, public research 
institutes. 
Theory clearly warns public authorities, technology policy authorities in particular, to be 
cautious and to be aware of the downside effects associated with collaboration. With all their 
benefits, partnerships have the negative potential to block competition and create various kinds 
of static and dynamic monopolies (in existing and future markets, respectively). 
 
Much research remains before contributions from economics, management, and public policy 
studies have a broader unified base of understanding of these phenomena. A unified framework 
to explain and analyze research partnerships is still lacking. Particular emphasis must continue to 
be paid to empirical research, even though it has tended to lag theoretical analysis in this subject 
because of data limitations. We expect that future empirical research will increase as more 
complete databases become available and expand in coverage, and it will systematically begin to 
evaluate both the private and social returns associated with collaboration. 
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